For this week’s assignment I chose to share a video posted by Al Jazeera covering the 2011 UAE elections for the Emirati Federal National Council. This has been only the second time the Emirates held elections; they were held in 2006, 2015 and 2019.
Jane Ferguson, who covered the election, concludes that “in the United Arab Emirates, long considered one of the most progressive of the Arab states, only modest gains towards democracy are being made.” Her rather pessimistic conclusion stems from the context of popular revolutions spreading in the Arab world. However, it is hard to establish a causal connection between the Arab Spring and democratization in the UAE, given that the first election for the FNC took place in 2006. In addition, looking at political changes in countries that experienced popular uprisings, the UAE was not really affected by the protests and generally speaking, we cannot argue that the uprisings led to significant democratization in the Arab world (with very few exceptions). Therefore, democratization in the UAE should be seen through the lens that Abdulkhaleq Abdulla provides in the video: “We are starting with baby steps.”
In the past I referred to Magaloni et al.[1] to argue that the FNC may be a way for the regime to please elites by incorporating them into the decision-making process. Holding elections for the FNC and gradually expanding the electorate is an extension of that, or as the UAE government claims:
“The objective of electing members to the FNC is to boost national loyalty and public interest in the national affairs, through contributions of young, educated and enthusiastic population and the role of the women.”
An overview of the political system was given in an earlier post. The FNC consists of 40 members: 20 are appointed by the seven Emirs and since 2006, following Supreme Council Resolution No. 4, the remaining 20 are elected by UAE citizens. In the first election 6,689 UAE citizens could vote, gradually increasing to 337,738 registered voters in 2019. Interestingly, the voter turnout was rather low (28% in 2011, ~35% in 2015 and 2019), which may have to do with the fact that the FNC does not have any legislative power but rather serves as a consultative organization. In addition, it is not clear how exactly the electorate is chosen (the Emirates pick the electorate), which was met with criticism and calls for universal voting rights.
Slater & Wong[2] challenge the notion that non-democracies negotiate democratic transition only when they face threats to their rule. Such transitions can also occur from a position of power or strength, in which the ruling elite anticipates that a democratic “concession” will not harm its control. This is the case in the UAE: by gradually democratizing the FNC, citizens perceive that their voice is heard while the regime itself is not challenged.
The Arab Spring may have accelerated (but not initiated) the process of expanding the electorate that began in 2006; Slater and Wong argue that resisting or delaying reform too long can in itself threaten the regime in the future and that there is a “sweet spot” in which the regime can concede some of its control yet still thrive. This strategy also allows the government to claim the role of reformer and portray an image of a regime that listens to citizens’ concerns. In that sense the UAE is an extreme embodiment of this argument, as the Federal Supreme Council, who holds the ultimate legislative power in the UAE, is not challenged at all, though citizens may perceive that democratization has started.
[1] Magaloni, Beatriz and Ruth Kricheli (2010). Political Order and One-Party Rule. Annual Review Of Political Science Vol. 13: pp. 123–43.
[2] Slater, Dan and Joseph Wong (2013). The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia. Perspectives on Politics, 11(3): pp. 717-733.
Manhattan of the Middle East 